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Interfaces for Personal Identity
Verification – Part 2: End-Point
PIV Card Application Interface

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I N F O R M A T I O N   S E C U R I T Y

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1.   Introduction

The Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-12 called for a common identification standard to be adopted governing the interoperable use of identity credentials to allow physical and logical access to Federal government locations and systems. The Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, Federal Information Processing Standard 201 (FIPS 201) [1] was developed to establish standards for identity credentials. Special Publication 800-73 (SP 800-73) specifies interface requirements for retrieving and using the identity credentials from the PIV Card[1] and is a companion document to FIPS 201.

1.1   Authority

This document has been developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, Public Law 107-347.

NIST is responsible for developing standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements, for providing adequate information security for all agency operations and assets, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems. This recommendation is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Section 8b(3), Securing Agency Information Systems, as analyzed in A-130, Appendix IV: Analysis of Key Sections. Supplemental information is provided A-130, Appendix III.

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1.2   Purpose

FIPS 201 defines procedures for the PIV lifecycle activities including identity proofing, registration, PIV Card issuance, and PIV Card usage. FIPS 201 also specifies that the identity credentials must be stored on a smart card. SP 800-73 contains technical specifications to interface with the smart card to retrieve and use the identity credentials. The specifications reflect the design goals of interoperability and PIV Card functions.   The goals are addressed by specifying a PIV data model, card edge interface, and application programming interface. Moreover, the specifications enumerate requirements where the standards include options and branches. SP 800-73 goes further by constraining implementers' interpretation of the normative standards. Such restrictions are designed to ease implementation, facilitate interoperability, and ensure performance, in a manner tailored for PIV applications.

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[1] A physical artifact (e.g., identity card, "smart" card) issued to an individual that contains stored identity credentials (e.g., photograph, cryptographic keys, biometric data) so that the claimed identity of the cardholder can be verified against the stored credentials by another person (human readable and verifiable) or an automated process (computer readable and verifiable).

1.3   Scope

SP 800-73 specifies the PIV data model, Application Programming Interface (API), and card interface requirements necessary to comply with the mandated use cases, as defined in Section 6 of FIPS 201 and as further elaborated in Section 3, for interoperability across deployments or agencies. Interoperability is defined as the use of PIV identity credentials such that client-application programs, compliant card applications and compliant integrated circuit cards (ICC) can be used interchangeably by all information processing systems across Federal agencies. SP 800-73 defines PIV data element identifiers, structure and format. SP 800-73 also describes the client application programming interface and the card command interface for use of the PIV Card.

This second Part, Special Publication 800-73 (SP 800-73) Part 2 – *End-Point PIV Card Application Interface* contains technical specifications of the PIV card command interface to the PIV card. The specification defines the set of commands surfaced by the PIV Card Application at the card edge of the ICC.

1.3   Audience and Assumptions

This document is targeted at Federal agencies and implementers of PIV systems. Readers are assumed to have a working knowledge of smart card standards and applications.

1.4   Content and Organization

All sections in this document are *normative* (i.e., mandatory for compliance) unless specified as *informative* (i.e., non-mandatory). Following is the structure of Part 2:

+ Section 1, *Introduction*, provides the purpose, scope, audience, and assumptions of the document and outlines its structure.

+ Section 2*, Overview: End-Point Concept and Construct,* describes the model of computation of the PIV Card Application and the PIV client-application programming interface including information processing concepts and data representation constructs.

+ Section 3, *End-Point PIV Card Application Card Command Interface,* describes the set of commands accessible by the PIV middleware to communicate with the PIV Card Application.

+ Appendix A, *Examples of the Use of GENERAL AUTHENTICATE, demonstrates the GENERAL AUHTENTICATE command. This section is informative.*

+ Appendix B, *Terms, Acronyms, and Notation*, contains the list of Terms and Acronyms used in this document and explains notation in use. This section is informative.

+ Appendix C, *References*, contains the list of documents used as references by this document.

+ Appendix D, *Document Updates*, lists modifications to the End-Point Card Application Interface since SP 800-73 was officially published. This section is informative.

2.   Overview: End-Point Concepts and Constructs

Special Publication 800-73 Part 2 and Part 3 define two interfaces to an ICC that contains the Personal Identity Verification card application: a high-level PIV client-API (Part 3) and a low-level PIV Card Application card command interface (Part 2, card edge).

The information processing concepts and data constructs on both interfaces are identical and may be referred to generically as the information processing concepts and data constructs on the *PIV interfaces* without specific reference to the client-application programming interface or the card command interface.

The client-application programming interface provides task-specific programmatic access to these concepts and constructs and the card command interface provides communication access to concepts and constructs.   The client-application programming interface is used by client applications using the PIV Card Application. The card command interface is used by software implementing the client-application programming interface (middleware).

The client-application programming interface is thought of as being at a higher level than the card command interface because access to a single entry point on the client-application programming interface may cause multiple card commands to traverse the card command interface. In other words, it may require more than one card command on the card command interface to accomplish the task represented by a single call on an entry point client-application programming interface.

The client-application programming interface is a program execution, call/return style interface whereas the card command interface is a communication protocol, command/response style interface. Because of this difference the representation of the PIV concepts and constructs as bits and bytes on the client-application program interface may be different from the representation of these same concepts and constructs on the card command interface.

2.1   Unified Card Command Interface

The card command interface of the PIV Card Application is a unification of the two card command interfaces found in Government Smart Card Interoperability Specification (GSC-IS) [6].

This unification is accomplished by adopting the object-oriented model of computation of the GSC-IS virtual machine card edge and realizing its technical details using the data structures and operations found in the international ICC standards [2] underpinning the GSC-IS file system card edge. This brings the PIV Card Application into conformance with those standards with minimal impact on existing GSC-IS deployments.

As a result of this unification, the behavior of the PIV Card Application and the client-applications accessing it is independent of the ICC platform on which the PIV Card Application is installed.

2.1.1   Platform Requirements

The following are the requirements that the PIV Card Application places on the ICC platform on which it is implemented or installed:

- global security status that includes the security status of a global cardholder PIN

- application selection using a truncated AID
- ability to reset the security status of an individual application
- indication to applications as to which physical communication interface – contact versus contactless – is in use
- support for the default selection of an application upon warm or cold reset.

2.2   Namespaces of the PIV Card Application

AID, Names, Tag Length Value (BER-TLV [3]) tags, ASN.1 [4] object identifiers (OIDs) and PIXes of the NIST RID used on the PIV interfaces are specified in Part 1. Part 1 also specifies the use of all unspecified names, BER-TLV tags, OID, and values of algorithm identifiers, key reference, and cryptographic mechanism identifiers.

2.3   Card Applications

Each command that appears on the card command interface shall be implemented by a *card application* that is resident in the ICC. The card command enables one to perform operations on and with the data objects to which the card application has access.

Each card application shall have a globally unique name called its Application Identifier (AID) [1, Part 4]. Except for the default applications, access to the card commands and data objects of a card application shall be gained by selecting the card application using its application identifier[2]. The PIX of the AID shall contain an encoding of the version of the card application. The AID of the Personal Identity Verification card application (PIV Card Application) is defined in Part 1.

The card application whose commands are currently being used is called the *currently selected application*.

2.3.1   Default Selected Card Application

The card platform shall support a default selected card application. In other words, there shall be a currently selected application immediately after a cold or warm reset. This card application is the default selected card application. The default card application may be the PIV Card Application or it may be another card application.

2.4   Security Architecture

The security architecture of an ICC is the means by which the security policies governing access to each data object stored on the card are represented within the card.

The software in the ICC applies these security policy representations to all card commands thereby ensuring that the prescribed data policies for the card applications are enforced.

The following subsections describe the security architecture of the PIV Card Application.

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[2] Access to the default application (and its commands and objects), occurs immediately after a warm or cold card reset without an explicit SELECT command.

2.4.1   Access Control Rule

An *access control rule* shall consist of an *access mode* and a *security condition*. The access mode is an operation that can be performed on a data object. A security condition is a Boolean expression using variables called security statuses that are defined below.

According to an access control rule, the action described by the access mode can be performed on the data object if and only if the security condition evaluates to TRUE for the current values of the security statuses. If there is no access control rule with an access mode describing a particular action, then that action shall never be performed on the data object.

2.4.2   Security Status

Associated with each authenticatable entity shall be a set of one or more Boolean variables each called a *security status indicator* of the authenticatable entity. Each security status indicator, in turn, is associated with a credential that can be used to authenticate the entity. The security status indicator of an authenticatable entity shall be TRUE if the credentials associated with the security status indicator of the authenticatable entity have been authenticated and FALSE otherwise.

A successful execution of an authentication protocol shall set the security status indicator associated with the credential used in the protocol to TRUE. An aborted or failed execution of an authentication protocol shall set the security status indicator associated with the credential used in the protocol to FALSE.

As an example, the credentials associated with two security status indicators of the card holder might be: PIN and fingerprint. Demonstration of knowledge of the PIN is the authentication protocol for the first security status indicator wherein the PIN is the credential. Comparison of the fingerprint template on the card with a fingerprint acquired from the card holder is the authentication protocol for the second security status indicator wherein the fingerprint is the credential. A security condition using these two security status indicators might be (PIN AND fingerprint).

A security status indicator shall be said to be a *global* security status indicator if it is not changed when the currently selected application changes from one application to another.

A security status indicator is said to be an *application* security status indicator if it is set to FALSE when the currently selected application changes from one application to another. Every security status indicator is either a global security status indicator or an application security status indicator.

The term *global security status* refers to the set of all global security status indicators. The term *application security status* refers to the set of all application security status indicators for a specific application.

2.4.3   Authentication of an Individual

Knowledge of a PIN is one means by which an individual can be authenticated to the PIV Card Application.

Personal identification numbers presented to the card command interface shall be 8 bytes long. If the actual PIN length is less than 8 bytes it shall be padded to 8 bytes with 'FF'. The 'FF' padding bytes shall be appended to the actual PIN. The bytes comprising the PIN shall not include 'FF'. For example,

- ▪ Actual PIN: "123456" or '31 32 33 34 35 36'
- ▪ Padded PIN presented to the card command interface: '31 32 33 34 35 36 FF FF'

2.5   Current State of the PIV Card Application

The elements of the *current state* of the PIV Card Application when the PIV Card Application is the currently selected application are described in Table 1.

Table 1. State of the PIV Card Application

State Name	Always Defined	Comment	Location of State
Global security status	Yes	Contains security status indicators that span all card applications on the platform.	PIV Platform
Currently selected application	Yes	The platform shall support the selection of a card application using a possibly right-truncated application identifier and there shall always be a currently selected application.	PIV Platform
Application security status	Yes	Contains security status indicators local to the PIV Card Application.	PIV Card Application

3.   End-Point PIV Card Application Card Command Interface

The Table 2 lists the card commands surfaced by the PIV Card Application at the card edge of the ICC when it is the currently selected card application. All PIV Card Application card commands shall be supported by a PIV Card Application. Card commands indicated with a 'Yes' in the Command Chaining column shall support command chaining for transmitting a data string too long for a single command as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 [2].

Table 2. PIV Card Application Card Commands

Type	Name	Contact Interface	Contactless Interface	Security Condition for Use	Command Chaining
PIV Card Application Card Commands for Data Access	**SELECT**	Yes	Yes	Always	No
	GET DATA	Yes	Yes	Data Dependent. See Table 1, Part 1.	No
PIV Card Application Card Commands for Authentication	**VERIFY**	Yes	No	Always	No
	CHANGE REFERENCE DATA	Yes	No	Application PIN	No
	RESET RETRY COUNTER	Yes	No	PIN Unblocking Key	No
	GENERAL AUTHENTICATE	Yes	Yes (See Note)	Key Dependent	Yes
PIV Card Application Card Commands for Credential Initialization and Administration	**PUT DATA**	Yes	No	PIV Card Application Administrator	Yes
	GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR	Yes	No	PIV Card Application Administrator	Yes

The PIV Card Application shall return the status word of '6A81' (Function not supported) when it receives a card command on the contactless interface marked "No" in the Contactless Interface column in Table 2.

Note: Cryptographic protocols using private/secret keys requiring "PIN" security condition shall not be used on the contactless interface.

3.1   PIV Card Application Card Commands for Data Access

3.1.1   SELECT Card Command

The SELECT card command sets the currently selected application. The PIV Card Application shall be selected by providing its application identifier (see Part 1, Section 2.2), in the data field of the SELECT command.

There shall be at most one PIV Card Application on any ICC. The PIV Card Application can also be made the currently selected application by providing the right-truncated version (see Part 1, Section 2.2); that is, without the two-byte version number in the data field of the SELECT command.

The complete AID, including the two-byte version, of the PIV Card Application that became the currently selected card application upon successful execution of the SELECT command (using the full or right-truncated PIV AID) shall be returned in the application property template.

If the currently selected application is the PIV Card Application when the SELECT command is given and the AID in the data field of the SELECT command is either the AID of the PIV Card Application or the right-truncated version thereof, then the PIV Card Application shall continue to be the currently selected application and the setting of all security status indicators in the PIV Card Application shall be unchanged.

If the currently selected application is the PIV Card Application when the SELECT command is given and the AID in the data field of the SELECT command is not the PIV Card Application (nor the right-truncated version thereof), but a valid AID supported by the ICC, then the PIV Card Application shall be deselected and all the PIV Card Application security status indicators in the PIV Card Application shall set to FALSE.

If the currently selected application is the PIV Card Application when the SELECT command is given and the AID in the data field of the SELECT command is an invalid AID not supported by the ICC, then the PIV Card Application shall remain the current selected card application and all PIV Card Application security status indicators shall remain unchanged.

Command Syntax

CLA	'00'
INS	'A4'
P1	'04'
P2	'00'
L$_c$	Length of application identifier
Data Field	Application identifier of the PIV Card Application, possibly right-truncated (See Section 2.2, Part 1)
L$_e$	Length of application property template

Response Syntax

Data Field	Application property template. See Table 3 below
SW1-SW2	Status word

Upon selection, the PIV Card Application shall return the application property template described in Table 5.

Table 3. Data Objects in the PIV Card Application Property Template (Tag '61')

Description	Tag	M/O	Comment
Application identifier of application	'4F'	M	The PIX of the AID includes the encoding of the version of the PIV Card Application. See Section 2.2, Part 1.
Coexistent tag allocation authority	'79'	M	Coexistent tag allocation authority template. See Table 4.
Application label	'50'	O	Text describing the application; e.g. for use on a man-machine interface.
Uniform resource locator	'5F50'	O	Reference to the specification describing the application.

Table 4. Data Objects in a Coexistent Tag Allocation Authority Template (Tag '79')

Description	Tag	M/O	Comment
Application identifier	'4F'	M	See Section 2.2, Part 1

SW1	SW2	Meaning
'6A'	'82'	Application not found
'90'	'00'	Successful execution

3.1.2   GET DATA Card Command

The GET DATA card command retrieves the data content of the single data object whose tag is given in the data field.

Command Syntax

CLA	'00'
INS	'CB'
P1	'3F'
P2	'FF'
L$_c$	'05'
Data Field	See Table 5
L$_e$	Number of data content bytes to be retrieved.

Table 5. Data Objects in the Data Field of the GET DATA Card Command

Name	Tag	M/O	Comment
Tag list	'5C'	M	BER-TLV tag of the data object to be retrieved. See Table 2, Part 1.

Response Syntax

Data Field	BER-TLV with the tag '53' containing in the value field the requested data object.
SW1-SW2	Status word

SW1	SW2	Meaning
'61'	'xx'	Successful execution where SW2 encodes the number of response data bytes still available
'69'	'82'	Security status not satisfied
'6A'	'82'	Data object not found
'90'	'00'	Successful execution

3.2   PIV Card Application Card Commands for Authentication

3.2.1   VERIFY Card Command

The VERIFY card command initiates the comparison in the card of the reference data indicated by the key reference with authentication data in the data field of the command.

Only key references specific to the PIV Card Application; i.e. local key references, shall be verified by the PIV Card Application VERIFY command.

If the current value of the retry counter associated with the key reference is zero, then the comparison shall not be made and the PIV Card Application shall return the status word '69 83'.

If the reference data in the command data field does not satisfy the criteria in Section 2.4.3, then the card command shall fail and the PIV Card Application shall return the status word '6A 80'.

If the authentication data in the command data field does not match reference data associated with the key reference then the card command shall fail.

If the card command succeeds, then the security status of the key reference shall be set to TRUE and the retry counter associated with the key reference shall be set to the reset retry value associated with the key reference.

If the card command fails, then the security status of the key reference shall be set to FALSE and the retry counter associated with the key reference shall be decremented by one.

The initial value of the retry counter and reset retry value associated with the key reference; i.e. the number of successive failures (retries) before the retry counter associated with the key reference reaches zero, is issuer dependent.

Command Syntax

CLA	'00'

INS	'20'
P1	'00'
P2	Key reference. See Part 1, Table 3.
L$_c$	'08'
Data Field	PIN reference data as described in 2.4.3
L$_e$	Empty

Response Syntax

SW1	SW2	Meaning
'63'	'CX'	Verification failed, X indicates the number of further allowed retries
'69'	'83'	Authentication method blocked
'6A'	'80'	Incorrect parameter in command data field
'6A'	'88'	Key reference not found
'90'	'00'	Successful execution

3.2.2 CHANGE REFERENCE DATA Card Command

The CHANGE REFERENCE DATA card command initiates the comparison of the verification data with
the current value of the reference data and if this comparison is successful replaces the reference data with
new reference data. Only reference data associated with key references specific to the PIV Card
Application can be changed by this PIV Card Application command.

Only reference data associated with key references specific to the PIV Card Application; i.e. local key
references shall be changed by the PIV Card Application CHANGE REFERENCE DATA command.

If the current value of the retry counter associated with the key reference is zero, then the reference data
associated with the key reference shall not be changed and the PIV Card Application shall the status word
'69 83'.

If the card command succeeds, then the security status of the key reference shall be set to TRUE and the
retry counter associated with the key reference shall be set to the reset retry value associated with the key
reference.

If the card command fails, then the security status of the key reference shall be set to FALSE and the retry
counter associated with the key reference shall be decremented by one.

The initial value of the retry counter and the reset retry value associated with the key reference; i.e. the
number of successive failures (retries) before the retry counter associated with the key reference reaches
zero, is issuer dependent.

If either the current reference data or the new reference data in the command field of the command does
not satisfy the criteria in Section 2.5.3, the PIV Card Application shall not change the reference data
associated with the key reference and shall return the status word '6A 80'.

Command Syntax

CLA	'00'
INS	'24'
P1	'00'
P2	Key reference. See Part 1, Table 3
L$_c$	'10'
Data Field	Current PIN reference data concatenated without delimitation with the new PIN reference data, both PINs as described in 2.4.3
L$_e$	Empty

Response Syntax

SW1	SW2	Meaning
'63'	'CX'	Reference data change failed, X indicates the number of further allowed retries or resets
'69'	'83'	Reference data change operation blocked
'6A'	'80'	Incorrect parameter in command data field
'6A'	'88'	Key reference not found
'90'	'00'	Successful execution

3.2.3   RESET RETRY COUNTER Card Command

The RESET RETRY COUNTER card command resets the retry counter of the key reference to its initial value and changes the reference data associated with the key reference. The command enables recovery of the PIN card application in the case that the cardholder has forgotten a PIV Card Application PIN.

Only retry counters associated with key references specific to the PIV Card Application; i.e. local key references, shall be reset by the PIV Card Application RESET RETRY COUNTER command.

If the current value of the reset counter associated with the key reference is zero, then retry counter associated with the key reference shall not be reset and the PIV Card Application shall the status word '69 83'.

If the card command succeeds, then the retry counter associated with the key reference shall be set to the reset retry value associated with the key reference. Neither the security status of the key reference or the reset counter shall be changed.

If the card command fails, then the security status of the key reference shall be set to FALSE and the reset counter associated with the key reference shall be decremented by one.

The initial reset counter associated with the key reference; i.e. the number of failures of the RESET RETRY COUNTER command before the reset counter associated with the key reference reaches zero, is issuer dependent.

If either the reset retry counter reference data (PUK) or the new reference data (PIN) in the command field of the command does not satisfy the criteria in Section 2.4.3, the PIV Card Application shall not reset the retry counter associated with the key reference and shall return the status word '6A 80'.

Command Syntax

CLA	'00'
INS	'2C'
P1	'00'
P2	Key reference. See Part 1, Table 3
L$_c$	'10'
Data Field	Reset retry counter reference data (PUK) concatenated without delimitation with the new reference data (PIN), both PUK and PIN as described in 2.4.3
L$_e$	Empty

Response Syntax

SW1	SW2	Meaning
'63'	'CX'	Reset failed, X indicates the number of further allowed resets
'69'	'83'	Reset operation blocked
'6A'	'80'	Incorrect parameter in command data field
'6A'	'88'	Key reference not found
'90'	'00'	Successful execution

3.2.4   GENERAL AUTHENTICATE Card Command

The GENERAL AUTHENTICATE card command performs a cryptographic operation such as an authentication protocol using the data provided in the data field of the command and returns the result of the cryptographic operation in the response data field.

The GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command shall be used to authenticate the card or a card application to the client-application (INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE), to authenticate an entity to the card (EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE), and to perform a mutual authentication between the card and an entity external to the card (MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE).

The GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command shall be used to realize the signing functionality on the PIV client-application programming interface. Data sent to the card is expected to be hashed off-card.

The GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command supports command chaining to permit the uninterrupted transmission of long command data fields to the PIV Card Application. If a card command other than the GENERAL AUTHENTICATICATE command is received by the PIV Card Application before the termination of a GENERAL AUTHENTICATE chain, the PIV Card Application shall rollback to the state it was in immediately prior to the reception of the first command in the interrupted chain. In other words, an interrupted GENERAL AUTHENTICATE chain has no effect on the PIV Card Application.

Command Syntax

CLA	'00' or '10' indicating command chaining.
INS	'87'

P1	Algorithm reference. See Table 6-2, SP 800-78 [7].
P2	Key reference. See Table 6-1, SP 800-78.
L$_c$	Length of data field
Data Field	See Table 6.
L$_e$	Absent or length of expected response

Table 6. Data Objects in the Dynamic Authentication Template (Tag '7C')

Name	Tag	M/O	Description
Witness	'80'	C	Demonstration of knowledge of a fact without revealing the fact. An empty witness is a request for a witness.
Challenge	'81'	C	One or more random numbers or byte sequences to be used in the authentication protocol.
Response	'82'	C	A sequence of bytes encoding a response step in an authentication protocol.
Committed challenge	'83'	C	Hash-code of a large random number including one or more challenges
Authentication code	'84'	C	Hash-code of one or more data fields and a witness data object.

The data objects that appear in the dynamic authentication template (tag '7C') in the data field of the GENERAL AUTHENTICATE card command depend on the authentication protocol being executed.

Response Syntax

Data Field	Absent or authentication-related data
SW1-SW2	Status word

SW1	SW2	Meaning
'61'	'xx'	Successful execution where SW2 encodes the number of response data bytes still available
'69'	'82'	Security status not satisfied
'6A'	'80'	Incorrect parameter in command data field
'6A'	'86'	Incorrect parameter in P1 or P2
'90'	'00'	Successful execution

3.3   PIV Card Application Card Commands for Credential Initialization and Administration

3.3.1   PUT DATA Card Command

The PUT DATA card command completely replaces the data content of a single data object in the PIV Card Application with new content.

Command Syntax

CLA	'00' or '10' indicating command chaining.
INS	'DB'
P1	'3F'
P2	'FF'
L$_c$	Length of data field
Data Field	See Table 7.
L$_e$	Empty

Table 7. Data Objects in the Data Field of the PUT DATA Card Command

Name	Tag	M/O	Description
Tag list	'5C'	M	Tag of the data object whose data content is to be replaced. See Table 2, Part 1.
Data	'53'	M	Data with tag '53' as an unstructured byte sequence.

Response Syntax

Data Field	Absent
SW1-SW2	Status word

SW1	SW2	Meaning
'69'	'82'	Security status not satisfied
'6A'	'84'	Not enough memory
'90'	'00'	Successful execution

3.3.2   GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR Card Command

The GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR card command initiates the generation and storing in the card of the reference data of an asymmetric key pair, i.e., a public key and a private key. The public key of the generated key pair is returned as the response to the command. If there is reference data currently associated with the key reference, it is replaced in full by the generated data.

Command Syntax

CLA	'00' or '10' indicating command chaining.
INS	'47'
P1	'00'
P2	Non-zero key reference to be assigned to the generated asymmetric key pair
L$_c$	Length of data field
Data Field	Control reference template. See Table 8.

L$_e$	Length of public key of data object template

Table 8. Data Objects in the Template (Tag 'AC')

Name	**Tag**	**M/O**	**Description**
Cryptographic mechanism identifier	'80'	M	See Part 1, Table 4.
Parameter	'81'	C	Specific to the cryptographic mechanism

Response Syntax

Data Field	Data objects of public key of generated key pair. See Table 9.
SW1-SW2	Status word

Table 9. Data Objects in the Template (Tag '7F49')

Name	**Tag**
Public key data objects for RSA	
Modulus	'81'
Public exponent	'82'
Public key data objects for ECDSA	
Prime	'81'
First coefficient	'82'
Second coefficient	'83'
Generator	'84'
Order	'85'
Point	'86'

SW1	**SW2**	**Meaning**
'61'	'xx'	Successful execution where SW2 encodes the number of response data bytes still available
'69'	'82'	Security status not satisfied
'6A'	'80'	Incorrect parameter in command data field; e.g. unrecognized cryptographic mechanism
'6A'	'86'	Incorrect parameter P2; cryptographic mechanism of reference data to be generated different than cryptographic mechanism of reference data of given key reference
'90'	'00'	Successful execution

Appendix A—Examples of the Use of GENERAL AUTHENTICATE

A.1   Authentication of the PIV Card Application Administrator

The PIV Card Application Administrator is authenticated by the PIV Card Application using a
challenge/response protocol. A challenge retrieved from the PIV Card Application is encrypted by the
client-application and returned to the PIV Card Application associated with key reference '9B', the key
reference to the PIV Card Application Administration Key. The PIV Card Application decrypts the
response using this reference data and the algorithm associated with the key reference; that is 3 Key
Triple DES – ECB (algorithm identifier '00'). If this decrypted value matches the previously provided
challenge, then the security status indicator of the PIV Card Application Administrator is set to TRUE
within the PIV Card Application.

Table 10 shows the GENERAL AUTHENTICATE card commands sent to the PIV Card Application to
realize this particular challenge/response protocol.

Table 10. Authentication of PIV Card Application Administrator

Command	Response	Comment
'00 87 00 00 04 7C 02 81 00'		Client-application requests a challenge from the PIV Card Application
	'7C 0A 81 08 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08'	Challenge returned to client-application by the PIV Card Application
'00 87 00 9B 0C 7C 0A 82 08 88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11'		Client-application returns the encryption of the challenge ('88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11') referencing algorithm '00' and key reference '9B'. See Tables 6.1 and 6.2 of SP 800-78.
	'9000'	PIV Card Application indicates successful authentication of PIV Card Application Administrator after decrypting '88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11' using the referenced algorithm and key and getting '01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08'

A.2   Validation of the PIV Card Application

The PIV Card Application is validated by first retrieving the X.509 Certificate of the PIV Authentication
Key (OID 2.16.840.1.101.3.7.2.1.1) and verifying the signature on this certificate. Assuming the
certificate is valid and current, the client-application requests the PIV Card Application to encrypt a
challenge using the private key associated with this certificate; i.e. key reference '9A', algorithm
identifier '06'. The response is decrypted using the public key in the certificate. If the decrypted
response matches the challenge, then the PIV Card Application is validated.

Table 11 shows the GENERAL AUTHENTICATE card commands sent to the PIV Card Application to realize the validation of the PIV Card Application.

Table 11 Validation of the PIV Card Application Using GENERAL AUTHENTICATE

Command	Response	Comment
'00 87 06 9A 0E 7C 0C 82 00 81 08 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08'		Client-application sends a challenge to the PIV Card Application indicating the reference data associated with key reference '9A' is to be used with algorithm '06'. See Tables 6.1 and 6.2 in SP 800-78.
	'7C 0A 82 08 88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11'	PIV Card Application returns the encryption of the challenge ('88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11') using the indicated key reference data and algorithm.

The same use of GENERAL AUTHENTICATE can be used to achieve a signing of a byte sequence such as a hash by the PIV Card Application. One need only indicate which algorithm and which key are to be used by setting values of the P1 and P2 parameters respectively.

Note that for exposition purposes this example uses only a 8-byte challenge and response with a 1024-bit RSA key. In actual usage a challenge and response more appropriate for this cryptographic algorithm would be used.

Appendix B—Terms, Acronyms, and Notation

B.1   Terms

Application Identifier   A globally unique identifier of a card application as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4.

Algorithm Identifier   A PIV algorithm identifier is a one-byte identifier that specifies a cryptographic algorithm and key size. For symmetric cryptographic operations, the algorithm identifier also specifies a mode of operation (i.e., CBC or ECB).

Authenticatable Entity   An entity that can successfully participate in an authentication protocol with a card application.

BER-TLV Data Object A data object coded according to ISO/IEC 8825-2.

Card   An integrated circuit card.

Card Application   A set of data objects and card commands that can be selected using an application identifier.

Client Application   A computer program running on a computer in communication with a card interface device.

Data Object   An item of information seen at the card command interface for which are specified a name, a description of logical content, a format and a coding.

Key Reference   A PIV key reference is a one-byte identifier that specifies a cryptographic key according to its PIV Key Type. The identifier is part of cryptographic material used in a cryptographic protocol such as an authentication or a signing protocol.

Object Identifier   A globally unique identifier of a data object as defined in ISO/IEC 8824-2.

Reference Data   Cryptographic material used in the performance a cryptographic protocol such as an authentication or a signing protocol. The reference data length is the maximum length of a password or PIN. For algorithms, the reference data length is the length of a key

Status Word   Two bytes returned by an integrated circuit card after processing any command that signify the success of or errors encountered during said processing.

Template   A (constructed) BER-TLV data object whose value field contains specific BER-TLV data objects.

B.2   Acronyms

AID   Application Identifier

APDU   Application Protocol Data Unit

API   Application Programming Interface

ASN.1   Abstract Syntax Notation

BER   Basic Encoding Rules

CLA   Class (first) byte of a card command

DES   Data Encryption Standard

DNS   Domain Name Server

ECDSA   Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

FIPS   Federal Information Processing Standards

FISMA   Federal Information Security Management Act

GSC-IAB   Government Smart Card Interagency Advisory Board

GSC-IS   Government Smart Card Interoperability Specification

ICC   Integrated Circuit Card

IEC   International Electrotechnical Commission

INS   Instruction (second) byte of a card command

ISO   International Standards Organization

LSB   Least Significant Bit

MSB   Most Significant Bit

OID   Object Identifier

OMB   Office of Management and Budget

P1   First parameter of a card command

P2   Second parameter of a card command

PIN   Personal Identification Number

PIV   Personal Identity Verification

PIX   Proprietary Identifier eXtension

PUK   PIN Unblocking Key

RFU   Reserved for Future Use

RID   Registered application provider IDentifier

RSA   Rivest, Shamir, Aldeman

SP   Special Publication

SW1   First byte of a two-byte status word

SW2   Second byte of a two-byte status word

TLV   Tag-Length-Value

B.3   Notation

The sixteen hexadecimal digits shall be denoted using the alphanumeric characters 0, 1, 2…, A, B, C, D, E, and F. A byte consists of two hexadecimal digits, for example, '2D'. A sequence of bytes may be enclosed in single quotation marks, for example 'A0 00 00 01 16' rather than given as a sequence of individual bytes, 'A0' '00' '00' '01' '16'.

A byte can also be represented by bits b8 to b1, where b8 is the most significant bit (MSB) and b1 is the least significant bit (LSB) of the byte. In textual or graphic representations, the leftmost bit is the MSB. Thus, for example, the most significant bit, b8, of '80' is 1 and the least significant bit, b1, is 0.

All bytes specified as RFU shall be set to '00' and all bits specified as reserved for future use shall be set to 0.

All lengths shall be measured in number of bytes unless otherwise noted.

Data objects in templates are described as being mandatory (M), optional (O) or conditional (C). 'Mandatory' means the data object shall appear in the template. 'Optional' means the data object may appear in the template. In the case of conditional data objects, the conditions under which they are required are provided in a footnote to the table.

In other tables the M/O column identifies properties of the PIV Card Application that shall be present (M) or may be present (O).

BER-TLV data object tags are represented as byte sequences as described above. Thus, for example, '4F' is the interindustry data object tag for an application identifier and '7F 60' is the interindustry data object tag for the biometric information template.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this standard are to be interpreted as described in IETF RFC 2119, Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [5].

Appendix C—References

[1] Federal Information Processing Standard 201-1, Change Notice 1, *Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors*, March 2006. (See http://csrc.nist.gov)

[2] ISO/IEC 7816 (Parts 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9), *Information technology — Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts.*

[3] ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, *Information technology — ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER).*

[4] ISO/IEC 8824-2:2002, *Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information object specification.*

[5] IETF RFC 2119, "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels," March, 1997.

[6] Government Smart Card Interoperability Specification, Version 2.1, NIST Interagency Report 6887 – 2003 Edition, July 16, 2003.

[7] NIST Special Publication 800-78-1, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification, August 2007. (See http://csrc.nist.gov)

Appendix D—Document Updates

The specific changes to this document are as follows:

1. SP 800-73-2 Part 2 inherited SP 800-73-1 card application interface specification from section 3, section 7 and Appendix B.
2. Section 1: Modified the scope section to tailor the scope to Part 2.
3. Section 1.4 Added text to flag informative section of Part 2.
4. Throughout: Document header reflects the Draft designation of SP 800-73-2 Part 2.
5. Troughout: References to OIDs, algorithm identifiers, key references, and AID point to Part 1 and SP 800-78, respectively.
6. Section 2.3: Rephrased and clarified the PIV Card Application access statement from "Access to the card commands and data objects of a card application shall be gained by selecting the card application using its application identifier" to" Except for the default applications, access to the card commands and data objects of a card application shall be gained by selecting the card application using its application identifier[3]. "
7. Section 2.3.1: Replaced the following sentence "Since the PIV Card Application can be selected by truncated AID, the selected card application may be the PIV card Application or it may be another card application". with "The default card application may be the PIV Card Application or it may be another card application."
8. Section 2.4.2: Clarified security status indicators.
9. Section 2.4.2: Added sentence to align with the text in the VERIFY command section: "An aborted or failed execution of an authentication protocol shall set the security status indicator associated with the credential used in the protocol to FALSE."
10. Section 3: Rephrased/Clarified the "Note" to GENERAL AUTHENITCATE.
11. Section 3.1.1: The behavior of the SELECT APDU has been modified to allow the PIV Card Application to remain the current selected application if a card-unsupported AID is specified. This approach is consistent with SP800-85A, section C.1.1.2.
12. Table 4: Replaced "NIST will post the PIV RID on http:///csrc.nist.gov/piv-project and will publish it in a technical note" with "See Section 2.2, Part 1"
13. Section 3.2.1: Added text to explicitly state that the VERIFY command shall fail, when the reference data is not formatted according to section 2.4.3 (PIN padding scheme).
14. Section 3.2.1: Added text to explicitly state that a no-match of a reference data (ie PIN) results in a command failure.
15. Section 3.2.2: Changed the meaning of the CHANGE REFERECNE DATA command status words '63 CX' from "Verification failed…" to "Reference data change failed…"
16. Section 3.2.2: Changed the meaning of the CHANGE REFERECNE DATA command status words '69 83' from "Authentication method blocked" to "Reference data change operation blocked"
17. Section 3.2.3: Changed the meaning of the RESET RETRY COUNTER command response status words '63 CX' from "Verification failed, X indicates the number of further allowed retries" to "Reset failed, X indicates the number of further allowed resets"
18. Section 3.2.3: Changed the meaning of the RESET RETRY COUNTER command response status words '69 83' from "Authentication method blocked" to "Reset operation blocked"
19. Section 3.2.1 and section 3.2.3: Removed duplicate "the" from "If the either the…"

20. Section 3.3.1 (PUT DATA Command): The data field of the response syntax is modified from "Absent or authentication related data" to "Absent" as per piv.nist.gov FAQ.
21. Appendix B: The definition of the Key References has been updated to incorporate the definition in SP 800-78.
22. Appendix B: The definition of the PIV Key Type as per SP800-78-1 has been added.
23. Appendix B: Expanded the definition of "Reference Data"
24. Appendix D: This Appendix enumerates the Updates to the PIV Card Command Interface since SP 800-73-1 was published.